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MARY BETH TINIER TAKES THE CONSTITUTION
TO SCHOOL
THEODORE F. DENNO*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT is entirely appropriate that the most recent issue involving symbolic
speech and the extent of its protection under the freedom of speech
and assembly clauses of the first amendment arose in a public school.
Since about the middle of the last century, "[a]lthough public school
systems materialized slowly, public education and democracy were ...
considered inseparable."' The Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District2 has taken a significant and de-
cisive step toward further development of the basic proposition of tying
public education to the system of constitutional freedoms. The number
of prior cases dealing with the extent of civil rights within the schools
is surprisingly small. For instance, there are only a few cases dealing
with a teacher's freedom of speech as a matter of law, and the number of
cases dealing specifically with the school pupil as the subject of consti-
tutional rights is virtually nil.
In a recent article on the subject of academic freedom, it was stated
that the rights of both teachers and students to be free from restraint in
classroom speech have received almost no legal recognition. In support
of this finding the author cites but three cases, not one of which directly
involves the matter of student-first amendment relations.a The article
points out, however, that the courts have dealt with the problem of beatle
haircuts (in which a conceivable first amendment question might have
been decided but was not) ,4 high school secret societies, ' and the par-
ticipation of married high school students in extracurricular activities.'
It appears, therefore, that Tinker is a pathfinder in that children them-
selves, claiming the common rights of citizenship within their institutional/
* Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Cortland.
1. A. Kelly & W. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development
324 (3d ed. 1963).
2. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
3. Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1963), citing
Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 348 F2d 464 (4th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); Epperson v. State, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d
322, rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
4. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 856 (1968).
5. Robinson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d 278, 53 Cal. Rptr.
781 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
6. Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967).
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legal school environment, have been recognized by our supreme consti-
tutional tribunal as proper subjects for those rights. Reading the decision
and noting the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Black, it will scarcely be
doubted that "[t] he Court's holding in this case ushers in... an entirely
new era in which the power to control pupils by the 'elected officials of
state supported public schools . . .' in the United States is in ultimate
effect transferred to the Supreme Court."' One presumes, however, that
in our constitutional system, in questions of primary right the "ultimate
effect" has always been one of the powers and duties of the Supreme
Court. It is reasonable to assert that prior to the Tinker decision the
primary freedom in public schools had been that of administrators from
judicial interference. In fact, until recently the issue of student rights
had apparently not been considered important enough to be met in legal
battle." After citing the cases of Epperson v. ArkansasO and Parker v.
Board of Education,0 both of which "present compelling claims of a vio-
lation of academic freedom, [and] the refusal of the courts ... to grant
judicial relief, ..."I' the article adopts the then acceptable dictum that
school children were not proper subjects of the first amendment. The
Supreme Court, however, while not granting certiorari in Parker, did
grant "judicial relief" in Epperson, thereby invoking a direct and sharp
implication of constitutional values. Leaving itself further argument for
the vastly more important issue of the Constitution in the schools, the
Court in Epperson found that it "need not take advantage of the broad
premise which the Court's decision in Meyer furnishes...., 2 In Meyer
v. Nebraska,"3 one of the landmark cases relied on in formulating the
Tinker rule, the Supreme Court stated that:
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals
prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to ap-
preciate. . . But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations on the power
of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is
plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tran-
quility has been shown.14
While the Epperson decision itself was not surprising, simply outlaw-
ing a state statute which forbade the teaching of evolutionl'---both an
7. 393 US. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
8. 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 3, at 1052.
9. 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967), rev'd, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
10. 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
11. 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 3, at 1053.
12. 393 U.S. at 105-06.
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
14. Id. at 402.
15. 393 U.S. at 104.
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obvious invasion of free speech and an attempt to foster fundamentalist
religious concepts-its tone was sharp. "Judicial interposition in the op-
eration of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requir-
ing care and restraint. Our courts, however, have not failed to apply the
first amendment's mandate in our educational system where essential
to safeguard the fundamental values of free speech and inquiry and of
belief."'6 This statement was a suitable overture to the extension of the
"fundamental values" to the school child himself, and in itself constitutes
a conclusive answer to Black's dissenting questions of "whether students
and teachers may use the schools at their whim as a platform for the
exercise of free speech ... and whether the Courts will allocate to them-
selves the function of deciding how the pupils' school day will be spent."' 7
Where school officials are constitutionally illiterate the courts may give
them lessons with "care and restraint."
Absent an excess of authority, the courts will find no more power in
Tinker to interfere with the discretionary acts of school officials than
they had before:
[C]ourts follow the general rule that they will not interfere with the actions of a
school board involving the exercise of judgment or discretion if the board acts in
good faith, in the absence of evidence that the board abused its authority and acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without proper authority.18
Within the meaning of "proper authority" must now be included full
regard for the rightful exercise of free speech by pupils. This is a clarifi-
cation and extension of procedure begun as long ago as 1925.
In Gitlow the Court said that the [fourteenth] amendment protects those specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are regarded as fundamental, not merely con-
venient or "nice to have"--formal rights, as the Court called them. The Court began
by classifying freedom of speech and press as fundamental.10
It may very well be that the Supreme Court has moved to place our
constitutional and judicial system more nearly in line with the ever-
deepening public dilemma, debate and division over what one author calls
the existentialist/essentialist argument.20 This is a profound and con-
stantly reappearing issue standing most obviously between the adolescents
16. Id.
17. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).
18. L. Garber & E. Reutter, The Yearbook of School Law: 1968 at 30-31 (1968), citing
Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1966), wherein
it is stated that, "[djiscretion means the exercise of judgment not bias or capriciousness."
19. Bartholomew, The Gitlow Doctrine Down to Date: II, 54 A.B.A.J. 785 (1968),
referring to Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
20. Shoben, Student Unrest: Some Forms Within the Chaos, 37 Bull. of the Nat'l Ass'n
of Secondary School Principals, Sept., 1968, at 1.
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and the more or less socially settled mature. Revolving around two deeply
divergent psychic postures, it is evoking in education a constantly wider
collision in the form of school/campus movements, student drug culture,
the expanding ranks of disaffection, noncommitment and social indiffer-
-ence of the young. For the Court to recognize a legitimate forum where
this deep cleavage may be given voice is perhaps a demonstration of its
ability to move not only to meet a public need but also to attempt to ac-
commodate the ancient institutions of the law to contemporary social
affairs. The situation has not yet been fully concretized, but in ideology, at
least, the law stands squarely in the path of the debate. On the one hand
is the rational, objective, impersonal, quantitative, perceptible; on the
other is the willful, subjective, personal, qualitative, suspectible. The dif-
ference is that between knowledge and understanding, fact and conviction,
Verstand and Gemiit, intellect and affection, society and community, mind
and heart, Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, external and internal, etc., etc.
The law is a process of intellect; its foundation is rationalism and logic;
its obvious ideal is a mechanistic objectivity such as symbolized in the
"scales of the law." It, therefore, belongs with the first of the two sides
of the above dichotomy and indeed, in many respects, stands out as its
primary social exemplar. Insofar as age is concerned, professional ser-
vants of the law belong predominantly to the "over thirty" group with
power obviously concentrated considerably on the far side of that bound-
ary. Increasingly, youth belongs to the second side of the dichotomy,
thus establishing the dividing line across the generation gap. If the Court
in the Tinker case has made even a late and rather formal move to recog-
nize the gap, to permit a form of public dialogue across it, to allow the
sides to show themselves, then it has served the nation perhaps better
than it knows.
Who would have thought the Supreme Court of the United States, de-
signed as the citadel of proprietary conservatism by the founding fathers,
would become the most liberal of the branches of the federal government
in the second half of the twentieth century? The issue between the essen-
tialists and existentialists is vastly more than education or philosophy.
In fact it is scarcely philosophy at all. It is breaking out all over the na-
tion in terms of the draft, the Vietnamese war, the civil rights issue, which
is the moral matter of the black man in the American society, the condi-
tion of the poor, etc., etc.--the whole establishment/anti-establishment
question. This issue is not a fad or passing phase of social development.
It is basic to the whole future. Beyond its immediate forms and phe-
nomenological outbursts this problem goes to the very marrow of social
life. The demand for effective, humanistic meaning in life is now so broad-
.cast, gathering power daily, that history's future is more than ever
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clouded in mystery. It is almost impossible to get the meaning of this
issue across to millions and millions of professional people. Communica-
tion is part of the gap. The sides speak wholly different languages based
on widely divergent Weltanschahungen. As it now stands institutionalized,
the question is rationalism itself.
2
'
IL STATE POWER To REGULATE FREE SPEECH
There is nothing in the Tinker opinion to suggest that the Court has
in any way inhibited the regulatory and sovereign functions of the states
within the bounds of constitutional prerogative. On the contrary, there
is explicit language strongly confirming state power, especially in the
schools. Citing the Epperson and Meyer cases, the majority states that
"[t]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the com-
prehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools.", When the first amendment rights are "abused ...
to incite to violence and crime... [t]he people through their legislatures
may protect themselves against that abuse. ' ' The right to the use of
streets and parks "must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order" 4
which is the duty of the state. "The power and the duty of the State to
take adequate steps to preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the
lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted.""5 The state's
legitimate interest in peace and harmony is affirmed." But, "[b]ecause
First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity"27 and "legislative
judgment" to promote "the preservation and protection of peace" in the
presence of first amendment rights should be "narrowly drawn."2-
Once the power of the state to control the public peace, regulate its
facilities and maintain the public convenience is affirmed within narrow,
specific limits, it is also affirmed that in doing so the state may not fore-
shorten the rights of citizens. Disturbing the peace, misusing facilities
and creating a genuine public inconvenience is abuse and not an exercise
21. For a good bibliography on the whole problem, see K. Keniston, Young Radicals:
Notes on Committed Youth 361-68 (1968). See also K. Keniston, The Uncommitted (1965).
For penetrating insight and concise analysis, few articles equal that of Shoben, supra note 20.
22. 393 U.S. at 507.
23. Dejong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
24. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
25. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
26. See Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968).
27. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
28. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
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of these rights. "But the legislative intervention can find constitutional
justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must
not be curtailed."29 This dictum of the inviolability of first amendment
freedoms coupled with the permission to control abuses, narrowly de-
fined, arising in connection with their exercise, has remained constitu-
tional doctrine. Thus, as stated in Hague v. CIO,80 free assembly and the
communication of "thoughts between citizens ... must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied ... ."31 In Edwards v. South Car-
olina32 the terms of constitutionality were exact:
We do not review in this case criminal convictions resulting from the evenhanded
application of a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative
judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed.33
Very recently the rule has been stated in terms relating to speech and
conduct, with the Supreme Court declaring that speech may not be regu-
lated under the guise of regulating conduct. 4 Moreover, the New York
Court of Appeals stated that:
[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech covers the substance rather than the
form of communication and ... the right to employ a particular mode of expression
will be vindicated only if it has been outlawed, not because of any legitimate State
interest, but solely for the purpose of censoring the underlying idea or thought.80
Addressing the constitutional question of free symbolic expression
raised in a case of draft card burning, the Supreme Court formulated
four tests, all of which had to be satisfied to justify governmental regu-
lation of first amendment guarantees:
1) Is it within the constitutional power of the government?
2) Does it further an important or substantial governmental interest?
3) Is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
expression?
4) Does the incidental restriction go no further than is essential to
the furtherance of the governmental interest?"0
'This case affirmed that not all modes of communication of ideas by con-
29. DeJong v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
30. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
31. Id. at 515-16.
32. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
33. Id. at 236.
34. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
35. People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 235, 229 N.E.2d 187, 196, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494-95
(1967), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
36. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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duct come under the "freedom of expression" which is constitutionally
protected 7
If the power of the state, under the tenth amendment, and the nature
of dual sovereignty, is universally recognized in the field of education
and if that power extends to compulsory attendance of children,38 and
to control of personnel and curriculum, the issue present in Tinker is not
state power per se. Nor is the issue that of the constitutionally acknowl-
edged rights of individuals. It is the delicate question of which of these
rights shall have preference and under what circumstances. In Tinker
we see one more example of the Supreme Court's difficult function of
ruling between two long recognized and accepted constitutional rights.
Since the Second World War this task has occupied a great deal more of
the time and attention of the justices. In Tinker an attempt is made to
deal with the contemporary nature of schools, to define in some limited
fashion what a student is before the law, and to view the state, together
with its public educational institutions, in terms of their de facto relations
with the living world. This is certainly not the last case and rule on the
question but it will stand as a landmark inasmuch as it is the first time
the position of the general school child is upheld against a specific claim
of state power,39 despite the repeated assertion made in Prince v. Massa-
ckusetts4" that "[t]he power of the state to control the conduct of chil-
dren reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults .... ,,41 Yet
the Court in Prince, the opinion so often relied on to support the special
case of childhood, apprehends the dilemma in Tinker by reminding us
that "[i]t is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community,
that children both be safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities
for growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens." 2
Here is the juxtaposition of the recognized extraordinary power of the
state to protect the child against the public need for "free and indepen-
dent well-developed men and citizens.MS In other words, permissible
limitations on constitutional rights exercised by students in school poses
a more difficult problem than the ordinarily difficult question of setting
priorities on acknowledged rights. The flavor of this question comes out
in Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion:
37. Id.
38. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-70 (1944).
39. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the position
of the schoolchild was vindicated. The case involved, however, a very limited sectarian
interest, not the right of the "general" student.
40. 321 US. 158 (1944).
41. Id. at 170.
42. Id. at 165.
43. Id.
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Although I agree with much of what is said in the Court's opinion, and with its
judgment in this case, I cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that, school
discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those
of adults. Indeed, I had thought the Court decided otherwise just last term in
Ginsberg v. New York .... I continue to hold the view I expressed in that case: "[A)
State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a
child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 44
As we shall see below, the "captive audience" phrase is not in the
character of a mere aside to the students involved. The Ginsberg decision,
after quoting Prince v. Massachusetts,45 goes somewhat further regard-
ing children and first amendment "protected freedoms," without much
determination of precisely what is meant. In some circumstances state
power extends "even where there is an invasion of protected free-
doms ... 2" The contrast this affords to Tinker is unmistakable, making
it all the more probable that the Court is consciously, if guardedly, mov-
ing toward extending the first amendment to the school under terms
requiring proof of need, before the state's power will be permitted to
curtail the freedoms. Is Tinker a prelude to establishing plenary con-
stitutional rights for school children absent a proven power and necessity
to restrict them?
III. THE TINKER CASE
The facts of the Tinker case were not in dispute. Several children of
the Des Moines school district, with the encouragement of their parents
and other adults, planned to wear black armbands to school in the days
before the Christmas holiday of 1965 to protest American involvement
in Vietnam. School authorities learned of the plan and moved to prevent
its execution by announcing a new regulation that prohibited the wearing
of armbands on school property. A refusal to remove an armband would
incur suspension from school until the armband was removed. Given the
opinion of the students and their parents regarding the immorality of the
American position in the Vietnamese war plus the apparent panic of
school officials, a clash was almost inevitable. The Tinker children defied
the new regulation, deliberately wore the black armbands, refused to re-
move them and were duly suspended from school. Their father brought
an action to enjoin the officials from disciplining the children. The issue
was in one sense pure in that it did not involve anything of substance
other than the public/political symbolism of wearing the armband. There
44. 393 U.S. at 514-15 (citations omitted).
45. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
46. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968).
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was no long hair, short skirt or disruptive conduct charge.4 - The district
court acknowledged that "[t]he wearing of an armband for the purpose
of expressing certain views is a symbolic act and falls within the pro-
tection of the first amendment's free speech clause. 4 8 It also declared
that, "[a] subject should never be excluded from the classroom merely
because it is controversial.149 But it went on to say that "actions of school
officials in this realm should not be limited to those instances where there
is a material or substantial interference with school discipline. School
officials must be given a wide discretion,"' 0 and so the court concluded
that "[t]he school officials involved had a reasonable basis for adopting
the armband regulation."' Thus the specific terms of Burnside v. Byars,"
a federal court of appeals decision holding that a regulation is without
force unless the action controlled is shown to "materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school," 53 was rejected. Burnside had been decided a few months
before Tinker but in the Fifth Circuit and, therefore, its decision was not
binding on the Tinker court in the Eighth Circuit. In the court of appeals
the Tinker case was argued twice, but resulted in a divided bench (4 to
4) which left the district court result standing, a judgment in favor of
the state's power to regulate.'
Tinker presented the Supreme Court with nearly an ideal situation on
which to decide a constitutional issue. For all practical purposes there
were no disturbing overtones. The claimed personal right was that of
symbolic speech versus the claimed public right in the state of plenary
power to regulate its schools in conjunction with an acknowledged supe-
rior right of control over children. The Court, of course, recognized the
clean, simple nature of the question:
Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment
rights collide -with the rules of the school authorities .... Our problem involves direct,
primary First Amendment rights akin to "pure speech."Zi 5
By thus equating the wearing of armbands with pure speech, the Court
avoided the difficult problem of establishing criteria for determining
47. This summary of the facts is taken from the Court's opinion and the lengthy dissent
of Justice Black.
48. T'ker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972
(S.D. Iowa 1966).
49. Id. at 973.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 749.
54. 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
55. 393 U.S. at 507-08.
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which kinds of symbolic conduct are therein included. The district court
had granted that much, and there was no doubt in the settling of the case.
The meaning attached to the emblems was announced long before its use
and was plain to all. Symbolic speech and the extent of its freedom was
not the question.56 It was the schoolchild's right, therefore, that faced
56. The term "pure speech" was used in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)
to note that the first and fourteenth amendments afford freedom "to those who communicate
ideas by pure speech," meaning verbal expression as distinguished from action. The Court's
view of a symbol as akin to "pure speech" gives recognition to a form of symbolic speech or
symbolic conduct which attempts to set the symbol and any accompanying conduct in
separate constitutional categories, the same as the right and its abuse. The pure symbol Is
the plain and simple communication of ideas and has constitutional protection, but the
accompanying conduct is, of course, legitimate matter for state concern. Yet the Isolation
of the two in practice and even for the purpose of a legal test is exceedingly difficult. The
Supreme Court has not yet tried to specify which kinds of conduct can be considered
expression and thus entitled to protection. See the extensive Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68
Colum. L. Rev. 1091 (196S) for a detailed analysis of the question. The Note points out
that the courts have gone no further than the common sense symbolic equivalent to
speech. "The cases dealing with nonverbal expression indicate that the courts are willing
to accord protection to symbolic conduct when it can be clearly classified as speech or its
equivalent. Once speech is found to exist, the court will require, through a balancing test,
that state regulation accommodate the individual's interest in expression." Id. at 1104 (foot-
note omitted). We have then a series: pure speech, symbolic speech, symbolic action, pure
action. It is obvious that none of these categories exist alone. Speech, verbal or symbolic, al-
ways takes place in some actional setting; the symbolic factor in action cannot be easily
separated from the action itself. One end of the spectrum emphasizes communication, which
may not be controlled, and the other, action, which may. The principle is the ancient "market-
place of ideas" held basic to the democratic process. What tests can be devised to determine
where the legitimate control interest of the state lies in the general mixture of symbols and
action? So far there is no answer, as the Note shows. The authors of the Note go on to es-
tablish two criteria for the definition of symbolic speech or conduct as pure speech: "fWirst,
the actor must be motivated only by the desire to communicate. Second, the conduct must be
capable of being understood by others as communication." Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
Aside from the quite probable difficulties courts would experience in trying to apply these two
rules, they amount to a definition, somewhat expanded, of speech. The problem turns on the
basic character of communication itself: all speech is symbolic and therefore, purely ideational
in form; but form is not matter, it is content. Content is immune to control if it does not
induce actions the state is constitutionally empowered to prohibit, bringing us right back to
the kernel of the matter, namely, some practical guide to measure the violence potential in
a communications situation.
As a very recent instance of symbolic action, the case of United States v. Berrigan, 283
F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968) points up the question vividly. There was no contesting the
facts that the defendants poured blood on records of the Selective Service System with a
manifest symbolic intent that would probably pass for speech under the test rules mentioned
above. But could anyone imagine any court in this country accepting the actions of
invading government offices and ritually pouring blood over official documents as pure
and simple speech protected by the first amendment? The decision in the case found for
the government's contention of criminal violation of law in spite of, and following, an
important summary of the status of symbolic speech.
the nation's highest bench. Is he wholly a passive object in his tutelage
to the state or is he a legitimate subject of the constitution?
Rather than moving to define symbolic speech and/or action, the Court
chose to interpret pure speech beyond a simply verbal expression. As a
matter of tactics in legal maneuvers there may be reasons to prefer one
move over the other, but the accomplished results are the final test. Ex-
panding on speech is moving from known solid ground to unexplored
territory rather than plunging directly into the unknown. Public accep-
tance, of course, is always a question in the justices' minds.
IV. SPEECH VEsus CONDUCT
The concept of separating ideas from actions is often a good and ade-
quate guide. For instance, a federal court struck down a Kentucky statute
on sedition declaring that it was too vague, that it prohibited freedom of
speech and press, and that it failed to distinguish between the advocacy
of ideas and advocacy of action.57 In our rapidly increasing arena of
social expression, political opinion and communication, protest, and spon-
taneous public actions, however, this simple duality test breaks down.
The complete mixture of idea with action, idea that is action, and the con-
cept of the "propaganda of the deed" does not permit application of the
advocacy/action formula so prominent in our recent constitutional his-
tory.5
8
The recent national rash of sit-ins, student activist demonstrations,
political picketing, civil disobedience and organized interference dem-
onstrates the kind of idea/action mixture now facing the courts for ad-
judication. To date no adequate practical formula has been developed
that is capable of discriminating between permissible first amendment
activity and the right of authorities to apprehend and control actual
assaults on the civil peace. In the public schools the question has not yet
reached the proportions of the existing issue on college campuses and
governmental agencies, but there is clear evidence that it is only a matter
of time.59
"It is true that some types of conduct are classified as symbolic speech and have been
afforded the protection of freedom of speech because symbolism in the form of a flag,
a salute, or picketing, et cetera, has been recognized as 'a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas."' Id. at 340. (citation omitted).
57. McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 84 (ED. Ky. 1967) holding Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 432.040 (1962) unconstitutional.
58. For an excellent treatment of this issue, see A. Kelly & W. Harbison, supra note 1, at
ch. 32. See also D. Nimxmo & T. Ungs, American Political Patterns: Conflict and Consensus
ch. 15 (2d ed. 1969).
59. See Brammer, The Coming Revolt of High School Students, Bull of the Natl Ass'n
of Secondary School Principals, Sept., 1968, at 13.
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One of the forms the general first amendment problem now takes in
the schools is the matter of student dress and appearance. This exempli-
fies the delicate nature of the whole issue. When does symbolic expression,
which per se is protected, become conduct controllable by the state?
Ancillary to this question is the further question: when, if ever, is ex-
pression identical to conduct and thereby controllable by the state? This
is much the same as the ancient difference between form and substance,
or the modern dichotomy between procedure and substance. As we have
seen, the substance in expression is under absolute protection but the
form and procedure are not. In instances where the form and substance
are identical what will be the rule? In instances where all forms are con-
trolled must the substance remain necessarily muzzled? In instances
where the form affects tastes, mores or social values rather than the
peace, health, welfare or morals of the community which side of the
dichotomy shall control? There is virtually no precedent for this kind of
collision.
There appears to be little statutory authority permitting school officials
to directly regulate the dress and appearance of school children, although
where appearance is related to behavior, regulation may be undertaken
as part of the state's police power.0° However, the number of cases in this
area is so small that no body of doctrine suggesting anything approaching
adequate rules has emerged. In 1923 a state supreme court upheld the
right of a school district to forbid the use of cosmetics in schools, spe-
cifically preventing a pupil from using face powder."' If any proof of the
proposition that times change is needed, here it is. Can anyone imagine
a public school board enforcing such a regulation today? There is indeed
a long list of grounds on which students have been barred from school.
[C]ourts have upheld expulsion for using cosmetics, wearing objectionable clothing,
smoking, serving liquor to other students, marriage, creating school bus disturbances,
and even writing a letter to a newspaper in which the student was "fanatical in his
[favorable] views as to atheism." 62
A curious situation exists in the Fifth Circuit. At first the court of
appeals clearly demonstrated its affirmation of the rule that only a show-
ing of actual interference with school functions could legitimately permit
curtailment of first amendment rights. But later it accepted the idea of
control if interference would likely or prospectively happen. In Ferrell
60. See Comment, The Right to Dress and Go to School, 37 U. Colo. L. Rev. 492, 494-95
(1965).
61. Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.M. 538 (1923).
62. Note, Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating the Style of a
Student's Hair, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 171 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
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v. Dallas Independent School District' there was no evidence what-
ever that the boys who sought entrance to a high school had created
any disturbance because of their long "Beafle" style haircuts. They had
not been let in and were suing to be admitted. In its decision denying the
suit, the court referred to two somewhat similar cases decided by it two
years earlier, both cases having virtually the same question, both answers
given the same day by the same judge. The difference between the two
was the simple test of the evidential facts. In one there had been inter-
ference with the school operation and in the other there had not. This is
quite evident in the following quotes from Ferrell.
In Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Ed.... we denied school children
the right to wear freedom buttons to school. Unquestionably those wearing the buttons
were exercising their protected rights of free speech and free communication of ideas.
However, we upheld the school's rule prohibiting the wearing of the buttons during
school hours on the ground that the evidence clearly demonstrated that such activity
interfered with the efficient operation of the school.0 4
The court then stated in a footnote:
Compare Burnside v. Byars . .. where the right to wear freedom buttons was not
denied the school children because there was a lack of evidence that such conduct
constituted any interference with the educational process05
Thus a de facto physical interference with the function of the schools was
the rule established in 1966. But by 1968 in the paragraph preceding the
remarks on Blackwell, quoted above, the court stated:
The compelling reason for the State infringement with which we deal is obvious.
The interest of the state in maintaining an effective and efficient school system is of
paramount importance. That which so interferes or hinders the state in providing
the best education possible for its people, must be eliminated or circumscribed as
needed. This is true even when that which is condemned is the exercise of a consti-
tutionally protected right.66
Thus in the Ferrell case the necessity for a finding of interference was
dropped. None was found or needed. In the nature of the case none could
be found. It is to be hoped that this amazing introduction of judicial
reversal, self-recognized reversal at that, will itself stand reversed by the
Supreme Court's Tinker decision. As one commentator noted, it appears
that the Fifth Circuit relied on the district court's Tinker result to reach
the result in Ferrell,"r but the Tinker court, in the Eighth Circuit, had
specifically denied the rule the Fifth Circuit had laid down in Burnside
63. 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968).
64. Id. at 703 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 703 n.9 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 703.
67. 47 N.C.L. Rev., supra note 62, at 174.
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when it held that the acts of school authorities "should not be limited to
those instances where there is a material or substantial interference with
school discipline,"0 8 requiring, of course, an interference in fact and not
simply in prospect. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, was induced away from
its own rule by the action of a district court in the Eighth. But in the
Supreme Court's decision in Tinker, the Burnside rule is repeatedly
reaffirmed 69 and appears established.
As to the right of the student to wear his hair as it suits him, the
question is not only a first amendment matter but may also come under
the common law right to privacy, possibly the fourth amendment's "free-
dom from unreasonable governmental interference," and "the right of
personal security" which " 'belongs as much to the citizen in the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his
secret affairs.' "70
Writing in defense of his fellows, one student sums up the subject of
appearance in the public schools in the precise terms of a test of fact.
They [the students] seem to feel that education is too important to the person to
be granted or denied on the basis of standards of personal appearance. The conten-
tion is that as long as a student's appearance does not in fact disrupt the educational
process, or constitute a threat to safety, it should not be of any concern to the
school.71
In the whole question of skirts, hair, clothes and general appearance of
school children there is more than a little suggestion that the public issue
which has arisen around the matter is the making of the authorities and
not the students, a result of reading a form of rebellion into the youngsters'
nonconformity and an expectation of disruption rather than a disruption
itself. 72 But in the Tinker case it was not a question of general appearance
but of the specific symbolic meaning known to all, of a particular extra
article of dress that caused the collision between the students' right and
the authorities'. In the words of Judge Tuttle, dissenting in Farrell,
there is striking meaning for both the general appearance and the specific
symbol as evinced by the school student:
68. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973
(S.D. Iowa 1966).
69. 393 U.S. at 505, 509, 511. The words in Burnside referring to the exercise of first
amendment rights in schools permit the exercise of such rights if they "do not materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school." Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
70. 47 N.C.L. Rev., supra note 62, at 175-76, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) on the fourth amendment, and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) on personal
security.
71. Plasco, School Student Dress and Appearance Regulations, 18 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
143, 149 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
72. Id. at 155.
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It seems to me it cannot be said too often that the constitutional rights of an
individual cannot be denied him because his exercise of them produces violent reac-
tion by those who would deprive him of the very rights he seeks to assert....
[These students] were barred because it was anticipated, by reason of previous
experiences, that their fellow students in some instances would do things that would
disrupt the serenity or calm of the school. It is these acts that should be prohibited,
not the expressions of individuality by the suspended studentsY
a
V. STUDENTS AND THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES
Courts are not the protagonists of the school situation. The issues lie
between the demands of students and the regulations of authorities. What
was once a virtual automaticity upholding at every level the power of
officialdom to have its way in the schools74 has given ground to the com-
mon, widespread social questions of what are our public schools, what do
we expect of them, how do they serve the community, what do we expect
of the students, what kind of education do we want for them, who is to
make the decisions regarding them and, lastly, where do the students
themselves stand? Amid all these questions we may have forgotten the
central fact that the school is "all about the student." Does this child
simply play the passive role of listening to all his masters and yielding to
all in authority? Where, if anywhere, is the limit to the authority, es-
pecially where it presumes to control the student's right to have a free
mind and express it?
Whatever social burdens are borne by students as a class, the dealing
with them will fall most heavily, second to the students themselves, on the
school authorities charged with administering the public educational in-
stitutions. This point of social cleavage is one of rising friction behooving
all of us to the most strenuous efforts to relieve it. There is no interest
involved which will not be served by a bridging of the currently widening
gap between the professional servants of education in the schools and the
children they are charged to instruct.
It is becoming ever plainer that students will no longer be controlled
by unabashed authority and force. They see too much of it in all they do.
The assumptions of fear and/or convenience on the part of administrators
moving them to simply order their students into one thing or another, the
use of unlimited regulation and rule making from the top down, especially
where it tends to infringe the ordinary rights of citizenship, and the
73. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist, 392 F.2d 697, 705-06 (5th Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion).
74. Plasco, supra note 71; this point is strikingly emphasized in almost all articles on
student legal rights, see, e.g., Brammer, supra note 59; Shoben, supra note 20; 47 N.C.L.
Rev., supra note 62. In research one is constantly reminded that the field of academic rights
and freedoms historically has referred to faculty or administration but not students.
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arbitrary exercise of school authority over the students, are gradually
becoming things of the past. It is not only by the actions of parents, in-
terest groups and students themselves but also by court decisions that
these changes are happening. School officials are, therefore, being forced
to respond to control from below, i.e., the students, as well as above, i.e.,
the higher authorities in the community. They must also listen to courts,
with the result that they frequently do not know where to place their
major attention.
As in most other control situations, authority in schools flows from the
top down along response lines set up by both the laws of legislatures and
the laws of economics. School boards control money and jobs in addition
to their legal right to make policy and rules for their schools. It is the
professional school staffs, administrators and teachers, who must enforce
the policies of the school board. Behind the school board stands the
political community, the county, state, and so on. Behind the students
stand their individual parents, and considering the generation gap, it
must often be said, "far" behind. It is obvious that the prime pressures
on administrators and teachers come from superior authority, certainly
not students, but it must also be emphatically noted that, given the in-
creased disaffection of students, the point of most potent cleavage is
between the students and the teacher and school administrator. Authority
is more conservative than freedom by nature and it is hardly surprising
that school boards and central administrators have not voluntarily moved
to encourage free student discussion in the schools. Our history shows
quite the reverse. As in the navy where a "tight ship," run strictly accord-
ing to the letter of regulations is blameless, so a "tight" school is much
safer for administrators in the presence of critical, conservative school
boards. It is not to the students that an accounting for the operation of
the school has to be given."
The controls used by school officials on students are not only the gen-
eral forms of respect toward its elders society expects and instills in
youth, including in some areas the use of physical punishment, but also
the more subtle forms generally in use in adult affairs.
A ready [example] is the youngster who hates school but still tries for good grades
because he needs them for later advancement. But nobody can do really well at what
he dislikes or has a low opinion of. So most of these youngsters fail to make the good
75. The theme that it is easier for school officials to discipline, control and suppress
students than to deal with higher authority is implicit in a great deal of the professional
commentary in the education field. See, e.g., Brammer, supra note 59; Griffiths, Student
Constitutional Rights: The Role of the Principal, Bull. of the Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary
School Principals, Sept., 1968, at 30; Shoben, supra note 20. See also L. Garber & E. Reutter,
supra note 18; Osterman, In High Schools Too, The New Republic, Apr. 5, 1969, at 13-14.
The topical literature in this field is now immense.
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grades. Another example is that of the many middle class parents who are highly
critical of existing schools but still want their children to do well in settings which, ac-
cording to them, are not fit to do well in. The miracle is that in spite of being pro-
jected into such contradictions some of our young people do quite well. Only one
wonders: at what needless emotional expense?
70
Moreover, since "one function of elementary and even secondary
education is indoctrinative-to transmit to succeeding generations the
body of knowledge and set of values shared by members of the com-
munity'" 7- it is apparent that the conformity mechanisms and pressures
used in the adult world are being passed on in the schools. It is not sur-
prising to find resultant friction, especially if many parents are themselves
disturbed by the conformity process. 7 Much of the evidence indicates
that students become either "activist"-i.e., rebellious, or "docile" due to
the constant conformist threat in terms of "college recommendations" and
"grade point averages." The great majority at present become "bored,
detached and malleable" but for the near future the activists "appear
destined to become the majority of high school youth." '7
Courts, however, despite having "repeatedly emphasized.., the com-
prehensive authority ... of school officials ... to ... control conduct in
the schools,"810 are not under the same pressures as those authorities and
it is inevitible that "public school students will be protected in their con-
stitutional rights" either by the educators themselves or by the courts.
"In all equity and justice, it is not enough that a segment of society-be
it teachers, school board members, or administrators-disapproves of
elements of pupil behavior or dress.'8s
VI. COURTS AND THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES
Although the procedure of the law deals exclusively with private cases
where public opinion and its expression may not enter, it has been recog-
nized since virtually the beginning of the Republic that courts, especially
the United States Supreme Court, in adjudicating private issues, do make
public policy. In the 1830's Alexis de Tocqueville noted in his Democracy
in America that practically all public questions in the United States sooner
or later take legal form and are passed upon by courts. In Thornhill v.
Alabama,8- for example, the Court took occasion to discourse on the social
76. B. Bettelheim, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age 82 (1960).
77. 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 3, at 1053.
78. See note 76 supra.
79. Brammer, supra note 59, at 14-15.
80. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507
(1969).
81. Griffiths, supra note 75, at 31, 37.
82. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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interest in education, an interest of obvious secondary importance to
school officials responding to their immediate superiors in the system.
Speaking of "effective means whereby the interested may enlighten the
public," the Court stated that:
It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the persuasive
threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of
discussion.
The safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an informed and
educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is of public concern ...
Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear
danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test
the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.83
One would think that the schools should be precisely the "market"
in which "to test the merits of ideas." The Court said in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire4 that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.8 5
Are school children, the very people most importantly associated with
ideas, to be deprived of developing and expressing their opinions in a
peaceful manner under the guise of the school's need to maintain order?
The question here is not the lewd, the obscene, the profane, the libelous;
nor is it "fighting" words that incite disturbance. Precisely the reverse.
After emphasizing that the danger of granting to an official discretionary
power over the use of public places for the communication of ideas "is to
place those who assert their First Amendment rights at his mercy,"
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Adderley v. Florida,0 suggested that:
[T]he power to control excesses of conduct [is] used to suppress the constitutional
right itself. [And] by allowing these orderly and civilized protests against in-
justice to be suppressed, we only increase the forces of frustration which the con-
ditions of second-class citizenship are generating amongst us.87
83. Id. at 97, 104-05.
84. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
85. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
86. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
87. Id. at 55-56 (dissenting opinion). The reference to "second-class citizenship" is to
that of black students who had demonstrated on the grounds of a jail against the arrest of
some of their colleagues. In justice Black's opinion he says of the statement by the peti-
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Does the state's acknowledged special interest in the child extend to
holding him a "second-class" citizen before the first amendment? Is it not
the special interest of the state to hold him especially a first-class citizen
in that respect? School authorities cannot refuse the expression of opin-
ions by students simply because it might inconvenience them or place
them in a disadvantageous light with their superiors. As already noted,
Tinker reasserted Burnside v. Byars : 88
[W]e must also emphasize that school officials cannot ignore expressions of feelings
with which they do not wish to contend. They cannot infringe on their students' right
to free and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment
to the Constitution, where the exercise of such rights in the school buildings and
schoolrooms do not materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.8 9
That the "right asserted.., must be measured in relationship to the sur-
rounding facts" 90 is not simply conceded but forcefully argued. What is
more appropriate for the development of young minds than the grappling
with public issues "in the surrounding facts" or in a public school? That
it may cause disturbance indicates there are some matters capable of
evoking energetic thought and response from the young. There is value in
such disturbance; the student is not to be taken as the passive, empty
container into which school authorities may pour what they please. Before
Tinker it was generally accepted that school authorities had broad powers
in the schools. Significantly, the courts have almost always upheld the
power of the educational institution or state to regulate curriculum and
classroom speech." Tinker, however, severely limits that power.
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as
well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not
be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech,
students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.92
To justify restrictions on speech, therefore, the state must show that
tioners that "petty criminal statutes may not be used to violate minorities' constitutional
rights": "This of course is true." Id. at 44.
88. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
89. Id. at 749.
90. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515, 526 (D.
Colo. 1966).
91. See generally Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045
(1968).
92. 393 U.S. at 511.
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the restriction "was caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an un-
popular viewpoint."O3 The fact that authorities fear disorder is not suffi-
cient to warrant restriction of free speech. "[U]ndifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to free-
dom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear....
But our Constitution says we must take this risk .... ,,94
Perhaps the idea of the unavoidability of some risk had never previ-
ously been applied to the schools, but it was not new. As far back as 1939
the Court held:
In every case . . . where legislative abridgment of the rights [of speech and press]
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legisla-
tion. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience
may well support regulations directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions.95
Then in Cantwell v. Connecticut"6 the Court said that:
[A] state may not unduly suppress free communication of views ... under the guise
of conserving desirable conditions.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield many types
of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. 7
Finally in Terminiello v. Chicago98 the meaning was made loud and clear:
[A]function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and
have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why
freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against cen-
sorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or un-
rest .... There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view ...
[The statute] permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger,
invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on
any of those grounds may not stand.0 9
Even where it was found necessary to restrict the right in order to pre-
93. Id. at 509.
94. Id. at 508.
95. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
96. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
97. Id. at 308, 310.
98. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
99. Id. at 4-5.
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serve the peace, the general rule of immunity up to that point was reiter-
ated.
It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the
suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker
passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they
are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.' 00
All kinds of speech, argument and persuasion are disturbing, possibly
causing great anger among school boards and officials who see their
smooth operations ruffled by mere students using the school to express
themselves. But, absent open interruption within classrooms, which is not
the issue, until students "pass the bounds of argument or persuasion and
undertake incitement to riot" or similar overt action, they are protected.
The first amendment and its freedoms of expression rest solidly on the
proposition that no one, no time, no institution has a monopoly on truth,
justice and the social welfare. Without the practice of free discussion,
without the open invitation for the widest participation, without the rec-
ognized immunity of one's ideas offered for public appraisal, how is this,
or any nation, going to assess its own condition, much less mobilize the
necessary popular energies to deal with its burgeoning public problems?
Children are right in focus here; rather than being suppressed they
should be encouraged to form and express views on social questions. As
a recent case indicated, 101 the first amendment not only guards but it also
encourages the use of its freedoms. It is the duty of the public authorities
to protect minorities taking advantage of free expression especially in the
face of antagonistic majorities.0 2
Highly significant for the evaluation of school experience in the devel-
opment of children's political attitudes is a recent study covering over
17,000 elementary students. It underscores what has been said here con-
cerning the need to permit and encourage free expression of political
views, since an atmosphere of political and/or opinion suppression in the
schools is likely to shape the attitudes of the children. "The public school
appears to be the most important and effective instrument of political
socialization in the United States." 1 3 True to the behaviorist research
technique, there are few, if any, judgments of social values in the work.
100. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
101. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 952 (N.D. M11. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S.
220 (1969).
102. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). These petitioners "were con-
victed upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions which they were
peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the com-
munity to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection." Id. at 237.
103. R. Hess & J. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 101
(1967).
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There is no judgment regarding the individual or general desirability of
any particular political, national or social views. There is a rather strict,
clinical reporting of the observed facts and data. The social values
children evince are not qualitatively weighed, but are simply, directly,
"quantitatively" reported. In these terms there was found a high degree
of similarity in teacher and pupil political views.
The extent of congruence in responses supports the conclusion that the school is a
powerful socializing agent in the area of citizenship and political behavior. It also
provides evidence that much of the basic socialization of political attitudes has taken
place before the end of the elementary school years. . . [M]any of the basic
orientations are established in the pre-high school years. 10 4
If we are bent on producing a nation of political indifferents, passives
and dociles, we might well do it by establishing, or continuing, as the case
all too often is, the repressive practices attached to the old aphorism that
"children are to be seen and not heard," so dear to Justice Black's rather
brittle views of education.10 5 It may be that once young children learn the
rote discipline of regimental silence and passive listening that very dis-
cipline "may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone,"'0 6 to quote the memorable words of Chief Justice Warren at-
tempting to right the wrongs done to school children on the basis of race.
There is a great deal of evidence for the existence of continuity between child-
hood experience and attitudes and adult attitudes and action. . . . The argument
for the importance of childhood learning for the political behavior of adults ap-
pears to have considerable validity. Of equal significance is the proposition that
the socialization of children maintains basic values of the society.' 07
It is now beyond dispute that the constitution goes to school with the
student and that the state may not interfere with the student's enjoyment
of its presence. The Supreme Court in Tinker quoted at length from its
earlier decision in Keyiskian v. Board of Regents: 08
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools.". . . The classroom is peculiarly the "market
place of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' 09
104. Id. at 114.
105. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
522 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
106. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
107. R. Hess & J. Torney, supra note 103, at 7.
108. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
109. 393 U.S. at 512 (citation omitted).
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The Court then went on to say:
If a regulation were adopted by school officials forbidding discussion of the
Vietnam conflict, or the expression by any student of opposition to it anywhere on
school property except as part of a prescribed classroom exercise, it would he
obvious that the regulation would violate the constitutional rights of students, at
least if it could not be justified by a showing that the students' activities would
materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school. 110
Thus the Court has established a balancing test whereby the author-
ities, in order to regulate, must show that the exercise of asserted rights
by the students will "materially and substantially" interfere with the
school's work and discipline. The burden of justifying curtailment, there-
fore, is on the state, and the presumption is with the student. Yet this
finding upholding the right of free speech and encumbering its control is
hardly new. Justice Brandeis wrote that officialdom must show at least
"reasonable ground" to curtail the freedom. His words have the flavor of
finally laying some ancient specter to rest.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assem-
bly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is
practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended
is imminent.11'
There must be a "reasonable apprehension of danger to organized govern-
ment," therefore. State action of control "which goes beyond this need
violates the principle of the Constitution.' 1 - The famous case of Bridges
v. California"3 produced very emphatic language, interpreting the mean-
ing of the first amendment at that time.
Moreover, the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot
alone justify a restriction upon freedom of speech or the press. The evil itself must
be "substantial". . . it must be "serious."..... And even the expression of "legislative
preferences or beliefs" cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or
annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of
liberty or expression. . . . [TJhe substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high .... 114
One wonders whether evils of such a caliber could ever issue from a
school where there is even a minimum of communication and respect
between authorities and students. Where there is not such a minimum,
a far more drastic examination of the reasons than a simple, but probably
110. Id. at 513.
111. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (concurring opinion).
112. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 US. 242, 258 (1937).
113. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
114. Id. at 262-63 (citation omitted).
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telltale, action of arbitrarily restricting students' free expression is
necessary. It is the primary duty of schools to guide the minds and de-
velop the experience of our children, not to muzzle their mouths as
the path of least resistance in a difficult situation. The process of the
blanket muzzle applied in the past is at least partly responsible for the
seething state of discontent in the schools at present. No attempt was
made to choose between the serious students and the plain disrupters;
all were either put off alike, suppressed in their expression, or given a
carte blanche fiat to speak in the classroom whenever and however they
pleased. This was a complete misunderstanding of the teachings of pro-
gressive education." 5
Speaking of the "preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the first amendment,"
Justice Rutledge held in Thomas v. Collins"; that, "it is the character
of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard gov-
erns the choice [between free exercise and control].... Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.""' Far from being empowered to interfere with the freedoms,
our governing bodies are established to secure them, as has been sug-
gested above. "The dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters
of public interest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of
Independence, an 'unalienable right' [sic] that 'governments are instituted
among men to secure.' ""18 It is fitting that Tinker relies in part on West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'" another case wherein
a state thought to override the freedoms of school children, trying to force
them to passively conform. The later case remarkably reaffirms the
explicit terms of the earlier case where it was said, "[t]he very purpose
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of . . . offi-
cials ... 12
A rather clear line of recent cases indicates that the traditional defer-
ence paid to education officials in their handling of student expression is
at an explicit end. The courts will not hesitate to interfere to extend
academic freedom to the students despite its traditional application to
teachers.'2' In 1966 the Supreme Court set aside the application of a
115. G. & F.M. Hechinger, Teen-age Tyranny 6 (1963).
116. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
117. Id. at 530.
118. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967).
119. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
120. Id. at 638.
121. See H.M. Jones, The American Concept of Academic Freedom, in Academic Freedom
and Tenure 224 (L. Joughin ed. 1967); 81 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 3, at 1050.
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Louisiana statute used to convict demonstrators in a library sit-in. They
were blacks determined to integrate the facility.
As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights [free speech and assembly] are
not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which
certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent
and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be.
.. . The statute was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to terminate the
reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest. . . . Interference
with this right, so exercised, by state action is intolerable under our Constitution. 22
The educational symbiosis of library and public school is obvious but the
relationship of the pupil to the school is a much more intense and delicate
one, considering the compulsory nature of attendance and purpose, age
groups and communal interest in the school. Is the student to have less
right where he is compelled to be than the casual library user going
there of his own volition? The courts have thought not:
It is basic in our law in this country that the privilege to communicate concerning
a matter of public interest is embraced in the First Amendment right relating to
freedom of speech and is constitutionally protected against infringement by state
officials. . . . [A]nd these First Amendment rights extend to school children and
students insofar as unreasonable rules are concerned.'2
Freedom of inquiry and expression is affirmed as not only necessary to
the educational process but also to the broader development of our whole
culture.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die.1 4
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 12-
Virtually all the public facilities and institutions in the country have
been opened to the presence of the first amendment, but most of them
only within the last two decades. As it stands, the list is quite impressive,
beginning with sidewalks, streets and parks,12 ' and including picketing in
122. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (footnote omitted).
123. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd., 273 F. Supp. 613, 617 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated,
402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968).
124. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
125. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 US. 589, 603 (1967).
126. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 US.
569 (1941).
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public, 1' 7 lunch counters and restaurants, 128 bus stations,1'2 state houses
and capitols, 3° public colleges and universities,'' libraries, 82 but not
yet clearly, jails. 3 By the Court's decision in Tinker we may assume
agreement that public schools are more closely related to institutions of
higher learning and libraries than to jails. Students, however, are none too
sure and are likely to take small comfort from the faraway legal victory
they have won in the marble temple of the law in Washington.
VII. CONCLUSION
Part of the significance of the new decision is the clear occasion it
affords to examine the new meaning of the public schools. Reference here
is not to theories of education or alternatives of curriculum, organization
of materials, faculty qualifications, etc., but to the social position of the
public educational institutions. And within that position emphasis is
almost exclusively laid on the emerging reaction and attitude. It is
vastly different from the traditional assumptions which are fairly repre-
sented in Justice Black's dissent: "I think the record overwhelmingly
shows that the armbands... took the students' minds off their classwork
and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the
Vietnam war."' 34 Here we see the picture of students doing as Black
doubtless imagines they should, namely, obediently bending their minds
to their classwork and then, by the presence of the black armbands
abandoning their minds and the classwork to take up the "highly emo-
tional" war. Aside from the Court's statement that there was "no evidence
whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools'
work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to
be let alone,"' 38 the split on the meaning of the school is apparent. The
students are experientially, emotionally, communally starved in the pres-
ence of impersonal, quantified classwork. The dissent continues:
And I repeat that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools,
kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and flaunt orders of school
officials to keep their minds on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new
revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary. The
next logical step, it appears to me, would be to hold unconstitutional laws that bar
127. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
128. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
129. Wolin v. Port Authority 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
130. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
131. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
132. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
133. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
134. 393 U.S. at 518.
135. Id. at 508.
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pupils under 21 or 18 from voting, or from being elected members of the Boards
of Education. 136
Thus we have the classic view of the student as a passive subject of the
adult system represented in the state's officials. Perhaps it is as much as
anything a tribute to our success in education, despite the stultifying
mechanistic process, that the students are now, at an early age, capable of
realizing and evaluating their own condition. The Court seemed to touch
the real issue when it noted that they were "not enclaves of totalitarian-
ism;" officials do not have "absolute authority" over students who are
"persons" under the Constitution, and these students do not have to sub-
mit their minds exclusively to the materials approved for them by the
state bureaucracies of their integrated elders."; Perhaps it is worth
wondering at this point whether Justice Black and the other Justices of
the Court, personally remember a happy and carefree childhood. So few
adults now realize that that condition of childhood has all but vanished.
Being themselves so heavily planned and structured, they tend to map out
the whole of every day for their children, leaving virtually no room for
the bursting spontaneity of the very young. We have here an exact parallel
to the tragic disappearance of the natural landscape and the reduction of
the urban environment to a boring routine of measured time, straight
lines, a constant mechanical din and regimental conformity even in our
pollution rates. We break what is human and happy in the child when we
insist on an integrated training almost from birth. It is no wonder they
question our values.
"Good grades" and concentration upon studies are seen by the adolescent com-
munity, and rightly so, as acquiescence and conformity to adult constraints. Social
affairs, extracurricular activities, and athletics are activities of their "own," activities
in which they can carry out positive actions on their own, in contrast to schoolwork,
where they carry out "assignments" from teachers. Such demands are galling to any
community that feels itself at all autonomous. 13 8
To this could be added volumes on the students' resentment of the regi-
mentation and busy work atmosphere of the public schools. In this highly
pluralistic, individualistic society affording everyone so many means of
personal and mass communication but demanding so much conformity as
the price of its high productivity, it can come as a surprise to no one that
the school, as the site of massed childhood's attention and obedience, is
giving way to creativity, commitment, emotional attachment to public
issues in a way not seen before by the adult generations. The fact is that
136. Id. at 518.
137. Id. at 511.
138. J. Coleman, The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and its Im-
pact on Education 172 (1961).
19691 TINKER
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the character of our public schools has changed and is still changing
away from the information transmission belt institution run on the basis
of an impersonal, efficient bureaucracy toward a community of students
who learn by the experience and contact of each other and the faculty in
terms of personal, social, national and international matters of intellec-
tual, emotional and artistic interest. The present school horizon is com-
pletely out of sight of the little red schoolhouse of the "3 R's."
The rigid trilogy of the state, the teacher and the pupil remains, how-
ever. The first hires the second to impart the information to the third.
In the area of public education this is the essentialist attitude as it has
been handed down from the proprietary, rugged individualist, frontier
world of Thomas Jefferson, wherein children grew up in the invariable
image of their personal forebears, generation after generation. What so
sharply separates the current generation from their predecessors is their
breaking with tradition and their discovery, perhaps due to their own
despair in the face of the regimented certainties of the past, that they
have more feeling for each other than they can ever have for the "lost
generation" of those over thirty. What is it that can move an educator to
the trenchant words, "I believe that happy adolescents are mythical
creatures"? There are so few adults who can see the wringer through
which our children are forced that few will understand when he adds,
"[t]he problems most of them feel are agonizing, as any trusted coun-
selor can attest.' 139
A society which is too proud to listen to its children, too afraid that they
may "disturb" it, is probably a society too afraid to look itself in the eye.
During the course of history there was probably precious little difference
between Mary Beth Tinker's message of the black armband and the
twelve year old boy who spoke to the elders in the temple. This time the
men in the black robes got wise. How will it be with the rest of us?
139. Brammer, supra note 59, at 17.
